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A REASSESSMENT OF MANDATORY STATE BAR
MEMBERSHIP IN LIGHT OF LEVINE V.
HEFFERNAN
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal and political divisiveness has been the hallmark of the integrated
bar' since its initial appearance over a half-century ago.2 Integrated bar
states3 have frequently encountered opposing viewpoints from lawyers who
have objected to the constitutionality of compulsory membership in an as-
sociation. In no place has this debate been more vigorous than in Wiscon-
sin. In fact, shortly after Wisconsin established its own integrated bar,4
furor by attorneys over compelled financial support of the bar resulted in a
lawsuit which challenged its constitutional validity. In Lathrop v. Dono-
hue,5 the United States Supreme Court held in a plurality opinion,6 that
1. The phrase "integrated bar" has been used synonymously with terms such as "unified
bar," "mandatory bar," or simply "state bar." Two characteristics are germane to every inte-
grated bar association: First, dues-paying membership is a precondition to practicing law in a
state that has such a bar; and second, the bar is created by court rule or by legislation. See D.
McKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR 22 (1963); Comment, The Integrated Bar Association, 30
FORDHAM L. REV. 477 (1962).
2. The first integrated bar association was established in North Dakota by legislative enact-
ment in 1921. For a complete list of other states with integrated bar associations, see infra note 3.
3. The following states have integrated bar associations: Alabama (integrated in 1923),
Alaska (1955), Arizona (1933), California (1927), Florida (1949), Georgia (1963), Idaho (1923),
Kentucky (1934), Louisiana (1940), Michigan (1935), Mississippi (1932), Missouri (1944), Ne-
braska (1937), Nevada (1929), New Hampshire (1968), New Mexico (1925), North Carolina
(1933), North Dakota (1921), Oklahoma (1939), Oregon (1935), South Carolina (1967), South
Dakota (1931), Texas (1939), Utah (1931), Virginia (1938), Washington (1933), West Virginia
(1945), Wisconsin (1956) and Wyoming (1939). The District of Columbia was integrated in 1972.
The territory of Puerto Rico was integrated in 1932 and the Virgin Islands were integrated in
1956. Nineteen states have no integrated bar: Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Vermont. See PARNESS, CITATIONS AND BIBLI-
OGRAPHY ON THE UNIFIED BAR IN THE UNITED STATES 3-4 (1973). Montana was integrated in
1974. See Application of the President of the Montana Bar Association, 163 Mont. 523, 518 P.2d
32 (1974). Rhode Island was integrated in 1973. See Petition of the Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 111
R.I. 936, 306 A.2d 199 (1973).
The trend of unification is evidenced by the number of jurisdictions which unified each decade:
six jurisdictions unified in the 1920s, fifteen in the 1930s, three in the 1950s, three in the 1960s,
and three in the 1970s. Id.
4. In 1956, the Wisconsin Supreme Court unified the bar on an experimental basis. See Inte-
gration of the Bar, 273 Wis. vii, 79 N.W.2d 441 (1956); In re Integration of the Bar, 273 Wis. 281,
77 N.W.2d 602 (1956). In 1958, the Court extended its 1956 unification order indefinitely. See In
re Integration of the Bar, 5 Wis. 2d 618, 93 N.W.2d 601 (1958).
5. 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d 404 (1960), aff'd, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
6. 367 U.S. 820 (1961) (Brennan, J., majority opinion). Concurring opinions were submitted
by Justice Harlan and Justice Whittaker. Justice Douglas and Justice Black dissented.
STATE BAR MEMBERSHIP
Wisconsin's mandatory bar membership requirement did not violate the
plaintiff's first amendment right not to associate with the state bar.7 Sup-
porters of the integrated bar movement hoped that the Court's pronounce-
ment in Lathrop would silence critics once and for all. However, opposition
to the integrated bar in Wisconsin and in other states has persisted.'
In 1988, lawyers opposing the integrated bar won an important victory
when a United States District Court declared Wisconsin's mandatory bar
membership requirement unconstitutional in Levine v. Supreme Court of
Wisconsin.9 The district court ruled that Lathrop was no longer determina-
tive in assessing the constitutional propriety of Wisconsin's mandatory bar
for two reasons.
First, in subsequent Supreme Court decisions in which freedom of asso-
ciation was an issue, the Court typically required that the state demonstrate
a compelling interest in abridging the rights of its citizens, rather than the
lesser requirement of a legitimate state interest analysis applied in Lath-
rop.' Second, because the character of the Wisconsin bar had changed sig-
nificantly since Lathrop, that case was factually distinguishable from the
current controversy." Concluding that Lathrop was no longer dispositive
on the issues, the district court applied a compelling state interest analysis
to the first amendment infringement and determined that compulsory bar
membership was unconstitutional. 2
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, the court reversed the district court decision, concluding that Lathrop
remained the controlling authority on the issue of integrated bar associa-
tions.1 3 Nevertheless, the court concurred with the district court that the
State Bar of Wisconsin had changed significantly since Lathrop.4 More-
over, the court of appeals stated that "[i]f Wisconsin's present integrated
bar is substantially similar to its predecessor, Lathrop compels us to con-
clude that it serves a legitimate state interest."'" Unfortunately, the court
of appeals never made an adequate comparison of the past and present bar
7. Id. at 843.
8. See infra note 119 for a list of cases raising compulsory bar membership issues.
9. 679 F. Supp. 1478 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (Crabb, C.J.), rev'd sub nom. Levine v. Heffernan, 864
F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 204 (1989).
10. 679 F. Supp. at 1493-94.
11. Id. at 1494.
12. Id. at 1502.
13. 864 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1988) (Flaum, J.).
14. Id. at 458 ("Since Lathrop was decided, the character of the Wisconsin bar has changed
considerably.").
15. Id. at 462.
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associations. Consequently, some doubt remains concerning whether Lath-
rop is indeed factually distinguishable from the Levine decision.
This Comment will first address the history of the integrated bar and the
underlying policy concerns which culminated in its nationwide implementa-
tion. Special attention will be given to the integrated bar's evolution in Wis-
consin, including a discussion of events before and after the Lathrop
decision. Part Three of the Comment will explore the constitutional impli-
cations raised by compulsory membership in an association. Part Four pro-
vides a discussion of the issues raised by the district court in Levine as well
as a critique of the court of appeals decision. Finally, this Comment will
conclude with an assessment of the efficacy of the integrated bar and a rec-
ommendation that states opt for voluntary bar status.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Integrated Bar
The national movement for unification of bar associations began in
1914. The principal advocate of the movement was Herbert Harley,
founder and executive secretary of the American Judicature Society. 6 Har-
ley believed that voluntary bars were "entirely inadequate to the needs of
the lawyer from either the standpoint of self-interest or from the standpoint
of public service."' 7 He asserted that bar associations should promote "so-
cial intercourse," political involvement in "statecraft," and the "need for
education of the bar, for its proper discipline, and for the conduct of its
business."' 8 Harley deemed that the best means to achieve those purposes
was to "[weld] all the lawyers of a state into one closely knit organiza-
tion."' 9  In retrospect, Harley had good reasons to argue for bar
integration.
First, the membership rate in state bar associations of the nineteenth
and early twentieth century was low. For example, as compared to the
medical societies of twenty-five states in the late 1920s, which had more
than two-thirds of their state's doctors as members, membership in volun-
16. The integrated bar movement in the United States was considered to have commenced in
1914 when Harley delivered a speech to the Lancaster County Bar Association in Lincoln, Ne-
braska on December 28, 1914. See D. McKEAN, supra note 1, at 30-37. For the complete text of
Harley's speech, see Harley, A Lawyer's Trust, 29 JUDICATURE 50 (1945); Sorenson, The Inte-
grated Bar and the Freedom of Nonassociation - Continuing Seige, 63 NEB. L. REV. 30, 34
(1984); Comment, Compelled Financial Support of a Bar Association and the Attorney's First
Amendment Rights: A Theoretical Analysis, 66 NEB. L. REv. 762, 767 (1987).
17. Harley, supra note 16, at 51.
18. Id. at 51-52.
19. Id. at 56.
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tary bar states during the 1920s included only ten percent to thirty percent
of the practicing lawyers.2 0 Such low membership was inexplicable consid-
ering that most bar associations were not selective with respect to whom
they admitted.21 However, since Harley's time, membership in voluntary
bar states has improved tremendously. 2
2
Second, early state bars had a difficult time maintaining membership
stability. Sudden fluctuations in the rank and file resulted in disintegration
or reorganization of many associations.23 Although unpredictable loss in
membership is still a problem today, fluctuations are usually small. Typi-
cally, losses in membership tend to be a manifestation of a protest against a
bar program or decision. Although integrated bars are able to avoid the
membership instability that voluntary bars sometimes experience, they are
by no means insulated from other sources of instability.24
Third, without members, bar associations were also deprived of their
greatest source of revenue. Absent modem sources of income, such as ad-
vertising, membership dues were the only source of income available for
state bars to use. Consequently, dues revenues in the statewide associations
of the early twentieth century were insufficient to sustain their program-
matic needs.2 However, when voluntary bars began to integrate, revenues
20. See Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept: Generalizing from the Wiscon-
sin Case, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1, 8.
21. Id. One explanation was that lawyers failed to join because activities concerning the ad-
ministration of justice were not the subject of bar meetings; rather, they were viewed as social
clubs. Id. According to Harley, the bar was too fragmented from differences in the lawyer's
work; the trend toward specialization was antithetical to lawyer solidarity. Id. at 9. Professor
Schneyer has criticized this argument for two reasons. First, the medical profession was more
fragmented and specialized and yet retained two-thirds of its members. Second, membership in
the voluntary bar has improved over the years. Id. at 9-10.
22. Id. at 10. As of February 28, 1989, membership in the voluntary bars in the following
Midwest states averaged approximately 85%: Illinois (82% - phone conference with Janet Paul of
the Illinois State Bar); Iowa (89% - phone conference with Craig Gaare of the Iowa State Bar);
Indiana (83% - conversation with Donna Lucas of the Indiana State Bar); Wisconsin (87% -
phone conference with Julie Chrisler of the State Bar of Wisconsin).
23. See R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMEs 271-72 (1953);
Schneyer, supra note 20, at 12.
24. Professor Schneyer has suggested that where the exit from an association is foreclosed,
members will be more likely to be vocal and obstructive to policies which they personally find
objectionable. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 13. Schneyer cites Wisconsin's attempt to assess
members a fee for an advertising campaign. Dissident members petitioned the state supreme
court, which subsequently prohibited the bar from the levying of the assessment. Id. (citing In re
Petition to Review Change in State Bar Dues, 86 Wis. 2d xv (1978)).
25. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 13-14. Modem bar associations gain revenue through
selling advertising in their state bar journals, seminar registration fees, admission fees for conven-
tions, and investments. For a list of revenue sources for the Wisconsin State Bar, see State Bar of
Wisconsin, A Year of Introspection, 61 Wis. B. BULL. 33, 35 (Nov. 1988).
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increased significantly. 6 Despite this fact, it is debatable whether integra-
tion has made it easier for state bars to collect revenue. One mistaken belief
about revenue generation is that some lawyers in integrated bars would be
more content to pay higher dues if they knew that all other lawyers would
be making a similar sacrifice. In reality, integration gives a voice to the
portion of a state's lawyers who do not want to be dues-paying members.
As a result, proposals for increases in dues have been met with great resist-
ance.2 7 Similar problems are not readily apparent in voluntary bar states.
In fact, dues in voluntary bar states tend to be higher than in integrated bar
states.28
B. The Purposes of Integration
Not only was integration touted as the solution to membership and rev-
enues problems common in the voluntary bar, the integrated bar was pro-
moted as a means of allowing lawyers to speak with one voice on legislative
issues and also "weed the profession of its unworthy members."'29 How-
ever, more recent events have suggested the integrated bar's ineffectiveness
in meeting the goals for which it was originally established.
26. For example, in 1929 the integrated North Dakota bar raised more money than the demo-
graphically similar, but yet to be integrated, South Dakota bar. North Dakota also spent four
times as much on discipline. See Am. Judicature Soc'y, Cost of Running State Bar, 13 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC'Y 185 (1930).
27. In 1976, the State Bar of Wisconsin petitioned the supreme court to increase the maxi-
mum dues amount from $40 to $100. However, the supreme court merely increased dues to $60
due to strong opposition by the membership and appointed a committee to study the bar activities
and governance. The following year, the bar renewed its request for the $100 dues amount but the
court refused, although it did authorize a separate $30 assessment to support newly created regu-
latory agencies. See In re Regulation of the Bar, 81 Wis. 2d xxxv (1977). In 1980, the District of
Columbia Bar Board of Governors proposed an increase in the dues ceiling from $50 to $150.
After a large segment of the bar vigorously protested, a subsequent referendum of the members
recommended a ceiling increase of not greater than $75. See Petition to Amend Rule I of the
Rules Governing the Bar, 431 A.2d 521, 525-26 (D.C. 1981); see also In re Amendment to Inte-
gration Rule, Article VIII, Subsection 1 (Dues), 416 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 1982) (refusal by the court
to further raise the dues ceiling for future years); Douglas v. State Bar, 183 Mont. 155, 598 P.2d
1080 (1979) (court reinstates its own authority to approve or disapprove future dues increases).
28. In 1987, Wisconsin's annual dues were $115. In neighboring Illinois, dues were $160, in
Iowa $150, and in Minnesota $115. Only in Indiana were dues lower ($95). See ABA, BAR
ACTIVITIES INVENTORY Tab C (1987).
29. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 15 (quoting 1 REP. ST. B. ASS'N. Wis. 5, 6, 9 (1878)




The voluntary bar was criticized as an association that had little influ-
ence in the legislative arena."0 This resulted in many integrated bar advo-
cates promoting "improv[ement] [in] the administration of justice" as a
formal purpose of the integrated bar.3 1 One of the primary justifications for
the integrated bar's involvement in the lawmaking process was that its work
advanced the public interest because it limited itself to subjects involving
purely technical expertise. 2 However, the parameters in which a state bar
could engage in such activity allowed it to go beyond merely technical legal
issues. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has permitted the State
Bar of Wisconsin ("State Bar" or "Bar") to take positions on legislation
only in areas pertaining to the "administration of justice, court reform, and
legal practice."3 Admittedly, while some activities were indeed technical,
the Wisconsin State Bar assumed an active role in other areas which were
highly political and yet pertained to the administration of justice.34 Never-
theless, despite the latitude the State Bar has on administration of justice
issues, further court restrictions on legislative position-taking may not be
possible.35
30. "It is... common knowledge that any bill proposed by the Association has usually met
defeat." See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 25 (quoting Hudnall, Address of George B. Hudnall,
President State Bar Association of Wisconsin, 12 REP. ST. B. Ass'N. Wis. 77, 78 (1916)). But see
Vanderbilt, Past, Present and Future of the Legal Profession, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 208,
209 (1937) (A unified bar has "standing with the bench, the chief executive, the legislature and the
public generally that it has nowhere else attained.").
31. See E. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK 6
(1954).
32. See Harley, Organizing the Bar for Public Service, 8 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 72, 79
(1924); Schneyer, supra note 20, at 30.
33. Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 239, 102 N.W.2d 404, 409 (1960), aff'd, 367 U.S.
820 (1961).
34. Professor Schneyer highlights the position the State Bar took with regard to no-fault
automobile insurance. Schneyer characterized it as a "foray into plain old politics." See
Schneyer, supra note 20, at 32. Another sensitive topic which has created problems elsewhere is
the Wisconsin bar's involvement in tort reform. During 1987-88 for example, the Bar's committee
on tort law recommended opposition to several tort reform proposals introduced to the Wisconsin
legislature, while drafting its own proposals. See State Bar of Wisconsin, A Year of Introspection,
61 Wis. B. BULL. 20, 30 (Nov. 1988). Bar involvement in tort reform was the subject of a court
challenge in New Hampshire. See In re Chapman, 128 N.H. 24, 509 A.2d 753 (1986); see also
Hollar v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 857 F.2d 163, 170 (3rd Cir. 1988) (endorsement of
the candidacy of a potential United States attorney); Levine v. Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 679
F. Supp. 1478, 1483 (W.D. Wis. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Levine v. Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457 (7th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 204 (1989) (among other items, a resolution voted upon and passed
by the board of governors opposing apartheid in South Africa).




2. Raising Professional Standards
The most important goal of the integrated bar concerned the upgrade of
admission standards and discipline. 36 As law practice became more con-
centrated in cities and more specialized, a7 lawyers had to rely less on their
personal reputations and more on marketing their expertise to unknown
persons; as consequently, "policing institutions which could establish the
bar's general trustworthiness became more valuable.",3
9
Although most lawyers felt that more rigorous admission standards
would increase client confidence, the greatest criticisms were aimed at the
primitive attorney discipline process.' Courts were willing to disbar law-
yers for egregious behavior but were unwilling to impose sanctions for mi-
nor offenses. Some local bar associations did retain grievance committees,
but the influence of the committees was minimal due to a lack of legitimacy,
funding and subpoena power.4 I Integrating the state bar was considered
the most effective method of curtailing these problems since an integrated
state bar would have adequate funding for investigatory and disciplinary
proceedings. Moreover, in its official capacity, the integrated bar would be
capable of establishing binding ethics rules, disciplinary sanctions, and an
infrastructure for adjudicating grievances.42
First, even under the state bar's rather broad authority, there has been more hand-
wringing and dissension over "jurisdictional" issues than one finds in voluntary bar as-
sociations. If new restrictions were tighter but no more precise than the present ones, still
more time and energy would be consumed in jurisdictional squabbles. Yet the line between
technical law reform and other legislative subjects seems too elusive to permit more precise
guidelines ....
Second, the state bar has considered itself to be prohibited from addressing some funda-
mental questions concerning our legal and constitutional order. If such questions are inap-
propriate for a state bar, they are nonetheless questions that lawyers, like other citizens, are
entitled under the First Amendment to address collectively. Tighter subject-matter limits
would widen the gap between what the state bar may address and what lawyers are entitled
to address collectively.
Schneyer, supra note 20, at 33-34 (footnote omitted).
36. See R. POUND, supra note 23, at 253-69.
37. J.W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 297-301 (1950).
38. M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 6 (1977).
39. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 16.
40. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 16-17. Wisconsin Bar President Claire Bird was sharply
critical of the lack of binding rules to govern the practice of law and the deficient lawyer discipline
machinery. See Bird, This Association: What Can It Be and Do?, 10 REP. ST. B. ASS'N WIS. 193,
194 (1914).
41. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 17 (citing Bird, This Association: What Can It Be and
Do?, 10 REP. ST. B. ASS'N WIS. 193, 201 (1914)).
42. Id. at 17-18 (citing Bird, This Association: What Can ItBe and Do?, 10 REP. ST. B. ASS'N
WIs. 193, 203 (1914)).
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The integrated bar brought some improvement in policing the profes-
sion, but not to the degree the early visionaries had foreseen. Most state
bars "were never given a significant role in defining admission standards,
preparing and grading bar examinations, or performing character investiga-
tions."43 In discipline, the promulgation of ethics rules was undertaken by
the state supreme courts, which adopted the American Bar Association
standards instead of logically designed rules.' In disciplinary enforcement,
courts were reluctant to be bound by state bar fact-finding and often exer-
cised their own judgment when enforcing punishment for misconduct. 45
Additionally, courts and legislatures also began to exercise their rulemaking
authority to create separate agencies for administering and controlling the
disciplinary machinery.46
3. The Intrinsic Value of Membership in an Integrated Association
In addition to the integrated bar's potential effectiveness in law reform
and discipline, proponents viewed integration itself as having a positive ef-
fect on the membership; "that when lawyers are brought into an association
... they gain an 'enlarged concept of [their] place in our social and eco-
nomic pattern.' "I Still a more popular belief was that a lawyer was "less
likely to play his proper role when he 'remains isolated without anything to
make him conscious of his relation to the bar as a whole, [and] without...
contact with its great traditions.'" 4 From a behavioral standpoint, the
natural tendency of lawyers was to subordinate their greater social responsi-
bilities to their personal goals and ambitions. Acting as an overriding and
guiding force, the integrated bar would direct the lawyer's awareness to
more serious socioeconomic concerns.49 Of course, this argument was
premised on the participation of lawyers in bar administration and related
activities. However, participation in the integrated bar is completely op-
43. Schneyer, supra note 20, at 19; see also G. BRAND, BAR ASSOCIATIONS, ATTORNEYS AND
JUDGES: ORGANIZATION, ETHICS, DISCIPLINE 1037-71 (1956).
44. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 19.
45. See Turrentine, May the Bar Set Its Own House in Order?, 34 MICH. L. REV. 200, 202
(1935).
46. In 1987, only 22 of the 33 state bars employed a full-time staff lawyer to receive, investi-
gate, and/or prosecute attorney discipline matters. See ABA, BAR ACTIVITIES INVENTORY,
supra note 28, at Tab I. This is down slightly from 1980, in which 24 states had similar involve-
ment. See ABA, DIRECTORY OF BAR ACTIVITIES 21 (1980). As of 1980, the courts of 19 juris-
dictions have assumed centralized control over all attorney discipline. Id.
47. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 38 (quoting Petition of Fla. State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d
902, 908 (Fla. 1949)).
48. Id. (quoting REPORT OF THE COMM. ON STATE BAR ORGANIZATION, ABA Conference
of Bar Delegates (St. Louis, Aug. 24, 1920)).
49. Id. at 39.
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tional. Consequently, the likelihood of "socializing" a lawyer is the same in
both voluntary and mandatory bar associations."
C. The Wisconsin Tradition
In any discussion of the unification debate, special focus on the evolu-
tion of Wisconsin's integrated bar seems justified not only because of the
Lathrop 5 and Levine 2 decisions, but also because the integrated bar debate
has existed longer in Wisconsin than in other states.
The first proposal for integration was made in 1914 by Wisconsin State
Bar President, Claire Bird.53 Although this proposal did not bring about
any immediate changes in the infrastructure of the State Bar, it was the
catalyst which sparked further discussion during the 1920s and an unsuc-
cessful legislative campaign in the 1930s."
Finally, in 1943, the Wisconsin legislature enacted a statute which cre-
ated a state bar and called upon the state supreme court to "provide for the
organization and government of the association."55 Although the court ac-
knowledged the validity of the statute, it postponed its implementation until
after the war.56 In 1946, when the State Bar President petitioned the court
to commence integration, the court unexpectedly denied the petition. 7
The 1946 integration opinion is significant because of its "unprece-
dented focus on the tension between state bar accountability and autonomy,
and for the way this focus affected the court's evaluation of the unified
bar."58 Essentially, the court believed that state bar dues should be treated
50. Id. Professor Schneyer suggests that mandatory state bars have no advantage over volun-
tary bars in encouraging participation. In committee involvement, he saw no difference between
mandatory state bar participation and voluntary bar participation. Id. at 39-40. Schneyer also
noted that a lawyer could participate in the bar by expressing his opinion in, or being influenced
by, the state bar journal. Yet, he saw this mode as ineffective and characterized the Wisconsin Bar
Bulletin as "predictable, shallow and one-sided" in issues pertaining to the economics of law prac-
tice. Id. at 42. Consequently, "whether one looks at active participation by lawyers in state bar
affairs or at what lawyers read in state bar journals, one finds scant support for the traditional
claim that bringing all lawyers together in an official statewide association expands professional
consciousness and thereby benefits society." Id. at 43.
51. Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d 404 (1960), aff'd, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
52. Levine v. Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 679 F. Supp. 1478 (W.D. Wis. 1988), rev'd sub
nom. Levine v. Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 204 (1989).
53. See Bird, supra note 40, at 194.
54. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 5 n.27.
55. 1943 Wis. LAWS 497.
56. See Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 11 N.W.2d 604 (1943).
57. In re Integration of the Bar, 249 Wis. 523, 25 N.W.2d 500 (1946).
58. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 48.
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as public funds.5 9 Therefore, close judicial scrutiny of the state bar's activi-
ties and expenditures would be required.' Believing the State Bar to be a
public agency, the court accordingly rejected the petition for integration
because "[t]he bar ought to have the untrammeled power of acting in uni-
son... without any feeling that its activities are subject to control or cen-
sorship."6 1 Judicial supervision would effectively nullify the perception that
an integrated bar was a self-governing body.6 2 Further, integration would
saddle the court with the burden of "scrutinizing every activity for which it
is proposed to expend funds derived from dues."63 Despite this ruling, the
court eventually reversed itself and established an integrated state bar.64
1. The Lathrop Decision
In 1960, a Madison lawyer, Trayton Lathrop challenged the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's ruling. Lathrop sued to recover his bar dues, arguing that
in light of the State Bar's legislative lobbying activity, compelling him to be
a member of the State Bar and pay dues in order to practice law in Wiscon-
sin abridged his first amendment rights of association and speech. 6' In a
unanimous decision, the state supreme court rejected his claim.66 In so rul-
ing, the court held that the integrated bar did not "compel the plaintiff to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend its meetings or
vote in its elections as he chooses."'67 Additionally, the court acknowledged
that although the use of mandatory dues to advocate positions in which
Lathrop disagreed posed a genuine first amendment concern, the "slight
inconvenience" to Lathrop was "far outweigh[ed]" by the state's interest in
improving the administration of justice. 68 Although some commentary has
59. In re Integration of the Bar, 249 Wis. at 528, 25 N.W.2d at 502. "No matter what these
fees be called, they are moneys [sic] required to be paid into the treasury of the bar for a public
purpose connected with the administration of justice." Id.
60. Id. "[T]his court must assume the responsibility of seeing that activities of the bar for
which these moneys [sic] are paid are sufficiently public to warrant the use of the money for their
promotion." Id.
61. Id. at 530, 25 N.W.2d at 503.
62. Id. at 528, 25 N.W.2d at 502.
63. Id. at 529-30, 25 N.W.2d at 503.
64. The Wisconsin Supreme Court unified the bar in 1956 on an experimental basis and made
these preliminary provisions permanent in 1958. See supra note 4.
65. Lathrop, 10 Wis. 2d at 230, 102 N.W.2d at 404.
66. Id. at 245, 102 N.W.2d at 412.
67. Id. at 237, 102 N.W.2d at 408.
68. Id. at 242, 102 N.W.2d at 411. The court compared a lawyer's financial support of state
bar activities to the general taxpayer's compelled support of the Wisconsin Judicial Council. The
court said that both the bar and the Judicial Council were created by state action to serve a public
purpose and that a "taxpayer could not successfully challenge the constitutionality of the dis-
bursement of public funds derived from taxes to support the activities of the judicial council
1989]
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been critical of the supreme court's reasoning in Lathrop,6 9 the court's deci-
sion exonerated the State Bar from the allegations of constitutional infringe-
ment and validated the use of mandatory dues to support positions which
furthered the administration of justice.
2. Supreme Court Review
It was thought that the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision would
quash further court challenges to State Bar activity. However, "all bets
were off"7 ° when the United States Supreme Court affirmed Lathrop in a
plurality decision which left the State Bar's right "to use ... the dues of
dissident members . . . in a state of 'disquieting Constitutional uncer-
tainty.'-71 Moreover, the view of several justices concerning the State
Bar's ability to take positions on legislative issues raised further concerns
which relate to the constitutional propriety of the integrated bar.
In the first of the Lathrop opinions, Justice Brennan7 2 held that
mandatory membership in the Wisconsin State Bar was constitutional, 73
but declined to address whether Lathrop could be compelled to contribute
to political causes which he opposed.74 The unresolved dues issue left the
State Bar to speculate as to how mandatory dues should be allocated to
legislative activity. However, Brennan's opinion may have had deeper sig-
nificance. In response to Lathrop's argument "that because of its legislative
merely because he was opposed to certain proposed legislation which it recommended ..... Id. at
243, 102 N.W.2d at 411.
69. Professor Schneyer criticized the decision on two counts. First, he felt that the court
trivialized many of the reasons for protecting the right of non-association, including the expres-
sion of disagreement by quitting and the desire not to associate one's self - even passively - with
a group's position. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 51. Second, the court's use of the taxpayer
analogy was not accurate since the Wisconsin Judicial Council was not a membership organiza-
tion and did not represent a particular constituency. Id. One of the purposes of the Wisconsin
State Bar is to "safeguard the proper professional interests of the members of the bar." See SCR
10.02(2) (1988). Schneyer also was critical of the first amendment scrutiny employed by the
court, which he characterized as "hardly ... demanding" and noted that a stricter review may
have focused the court more precisely on the Bar's effectiveness in law reform. See Schneyer,
supra note 20, at 53 n.298.
70. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 53.
71. Id. (citing Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 848 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
72. Justice Brennan wrote for the plurality. Joining him were Chief Justice Warren, Justice
Clark and Justice Stewart. Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 821.
73. Id. at 843. "Given the character of the integrated bar shown on this record, in the light of
the limitation of the membership requirement to the compulsory payment of reasonable annual
dues, we are unable to find any impingement upon protected rights of association." Id.
74. Id. at 847-48. Because Lathrop did not specify those bar positions to which he objected,
the Court reserved for another day the question of compelled financial support for activities to
which a member objects. Id.
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activities, the State Bar partakes of the character of a political party,"7 5
Justice Brennan repeated a policy statement set forth by the Bar, in which
legislative activity would not be sponsored unless the board of governors
was "satisfied that the recommendation represents the consensus and the
best composite judgment of the legal profession of this state."76 If the mem-
bership "is of a substantially divided opinion,"17 7 then no action would be
taken. Brennan noted that this policy was based on statements made by
Alfred LaFrance.78 LaFrance recommended that in the realm of legislative
activity:
the rule of substantial unanimity should be observed. Unless the
lawyers of Wisconsin are substantially for or against a proposal, the
State Bar should neither support nor oppose the proposal.... The
State Bar represents all of the lawyers of this state and in that capac-
ity we must safeguard the interests of all.7 9
Presumably, Justice Brennan applied this rationale to portray the Wiscon-
sin State Bar's legislative advocacy in terms more closely akin to advocacy
in which a voluntary bar would engage, with the clear presumption that the
payment of dues in a voluntary association is indicative of the member's
consent to the activity.80 Obviously, to have every lawyer consent to an
activity in an integrated bar, the rule of substantial unanimity must mean
complete unanimity. From this viewpoint, Brennan's argument fails be-
cause complete unanimity is unattainable and would paralyze the Bar's
ability to take positions on legislative matters.8"
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan believed that bar integration
itself was constitutional, 82 yet he felt that Lathrop's allegation relating to
compulsory financial support of certain activities posed a genuine first
amendment issue which the Court should have addressed.83 However,
Harlan felt that Lathrop's right of freedom from such compulsory support
was substantially outweighed by the state's interest in maintaining a public
"commission" designed to "recommend changes in the more or less techni-
cal areas of the law."84 To argue otherwise would have the effect of jeop-
75. Id. at 833.
76. Id. at 834 n.9.
77. Id.
78. LaFrance was a former president of the voluntary Wisconsin Bar Association. Id. at 834.
79. Id. (quoting A. LaFrance, Report Respecting Proposed Procedure on Legislative Matters,
30 Wis. B. BULL. 41, 42 (Aug. 1957)).
80. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 56.
81. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 56-57.
82. Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 864-65.
83. Id. at 848-49.
84. Id. at 864.
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ardizing the use of tax revenues to support the legislative activities of
organizations such as the judicial councils of each state and federal organi-
zations like the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States. 5
In stark contrast to the concurring opinions upholding integration, Jus-
tice Douglas perceived integration to be invalid on its face.86 Douglas' chief
concern was over the notion of forced association itself: "The right to be-
long - or not to belong - is deep in the American tradition., 8 7 Justice
Douglas also recognized the similarity between bar unification and statutes
authorizing compulsory membership in unions; but distinguished the two
based on the historically proven need for "collective bargaining as one of
the means of preserving industrial peace.""8 Since Wisconsin could not
point to any "exceptional circumstances" 9 justifying a first amendment in-
fringement, its integration law could not survive the level of scrutiny called
for in such situations. 90
3. The Wisconsin Bar After Lathrop
Constitutional considerations left unaddressed by the Court in Lathrop
resurfaced several years later when the State Bar became involved in the
judicial selection process. In 1963, the State Bar polled its members to de-
termine if they felt a candidate for a federal judgeship was qualified for the
job. The bar association stated at the outset that it would not publish the
results unless a majority of the respondents favored disclosure. Although a
majority did approve of the measure, shortly before publication, an attorney
petitioned the state supreme court to prohibit its dissemination on the
grounds that judicial polling was beyond the scope of the State Bar's pow-
85. Id. at 853.
86. Id. at 877-85. Justice Black also dissented, but saw no need to totally dismantle the
integrated bar. He felt that the appropriate remedy was to refund that part of Lathrop's dues
spent on programs which he opposed. Id. at 877.
87. Id. at 881-82.
88. Id. at 880; see infra notes 163-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of first amend-
ment considerations with respect to unions.
89. Id. at 882 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
[T]he necessities of life put us into relations with others that may be undesirable or even
abhorrent, if individual standards were to obtain. Yet if this right is to be curtailed by law,
if the individual is to be compelled to associate with others in a common cause, then I
would think exceptional circumstances should be shown.
Id.
90. "I would treat laws of this character like any that touch on First Amendment rights....
[They must] be 'narrowly drawn' so as to be confined to the precise evil within the competence of
the legislature." Id. at 882 (citation omitted).
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ers. In response, the state supreme court in Axel v. State Bar of Wisconsin 91
held that judicial qualification polls were an important aspect of the admin-
istration of justice and thus permissible.92 It is interesting to note, however,
that since Axel, the State Bar has not engaged in judicial polling.9 3
As for the rule of substantial unanimity enunciated in Lathrop, the State
Bar opted to abide by its policy statement which required "substantial una-
nimity" as a prerequisite to position taking. However, in 1977, the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court's first Committee to Review the State Bar9 4 found that
the public greatly benefited from the Bar's position taking and thus recom-
mended that the substantial unanimity requirement be relaxed, "even
though the liberty of dissenting State Bar members may be abridged as a
result."95
Important changes in the infrastructure of the Bar also occurred during
the 1970s. In 1976, the Wisconsin Supreme Court created the Board of
Attorneys Professional Competence and the Board of Attorneys Profes-
sional Responsibility to administer bar admission requirements and attor-
ney discipline.9 6 By this action, the State Bar was almost totally divested of
"hands-on" involvement in regulating discipline and ethics, since both or-
ganizations were created and operated under the exclusive aegis of the state
supreme court. 9 7 Financial support for these two agencies was to be de-
rived from assessments on all lawyers separate from the mandatory dues
payments. 98 Additionally, the court placed continuing legal education
(CLE) into a regulatory agency under its auspices, with funding for the
91. 21 Wis. 2d 661, 124 N.W.2d 671 (1963).
92. Id. at 667-68, 124 N.W.2d at 675.
93. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 81. As of 1987, only 15 of the 33 integrated bars conduct
judicial polling. See ABA, BAR AcTivrriEs INVENTORY, supra note 28, at Tab P.
94. Supreme Court Rule 10.10 authorizes the Wisconsin Supreme Court to "appoint a com-
mittee to review the state bar's performance in carrying out its public functions at such time the
court deems advisable." This type of authorization is more commonly known as a "sunset law."
See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 73. The report issued by the first committee was known as the
Parnell Report, named after the committee chairman Judge Andrew Parnell of Appleton,
Wisconsin.
95. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 82 (quoting The Parnell Report at 18). The Wisconsin
Supreme Court did not address this issue when responding to the findings of the Parnell Report.
See In re Regulation of the Bar, 81 Wis. 2d xxxv, xxxix (1977).
96. See In re Regulation of the Bar, 74 Wis. 2d ix (1976).
97. Id. at x (all members are appointed by the state supreme court).
98. See Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 10.03(5) (1988). Lawyers are also separately assessed to
support the Client Security Fund, a fund designed to compensate injured clients for the miscon-
duct of their attorneys. See SCR 12.04(1) (1988). For the sake of convenience, the state bar
collects payments which support these regulatory programs at the same time it collects annual
dues. See SCR 10.03(5) (1988).
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program to be likewise derived from sources other than dues payments.99
This intervention by the supreme court was motivated primarily by a con-
cern that the State Bar was not sufficiently accountable to the public; that
an organization of lawyers would be more concerned about their own inter-
ests than the interests of the public at large." Along these lines, the court,
in 1977, also made an alteration in the makeup of the bar association's
board of governors, permitting three non-lawyers to sit on the board.10 1
Voting rights were extended to those members in 1980.102
The Parnell Committee 3 was also told to study the State Bar and to
make recommendations to the supreme court on the viability of continued
operation as an integrated bar."4 Although the committee and court deter-
mined that "the large majority of Wisconsin lawyers, support, or at least do
not oppose, the unified bar,"10 5 that determination did not prevent more
than 400 lawyers from signing a petition requesting that the State Bar's
board of governors submit several questions to the membership, the content
of which addressed the continuance of the integrated bar.106 The supreme
court denied the petitioner's request based on several technical
discrepancies. 107
99. CLE is regulated by the Board of Attorneys of Professional Competence and funded by a
separate assessment on lawyers. See Regulation of the Bar, 81 Wis. 2d at xli. One of the regula-
tory functions this agency performs is accreditation of CLE providers. See SCR 31.08 (1988).
Professor Schneyer has suggested that removing these regulatory programs from the bar only
enhanced public confidence in its integrity. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 98.
100. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 72-73, 89, 98.
101. See Regulation of the Bar, 81 Wis. 2d at xlii.
102. See In re Amendment of State Bar Rules, 96 Wis. 2d xi (1980).
103. See supra note 94.
104. The committee was to make recommendations to the court on four questions:
(1) the concept of the integrated bar and whether it should continue in Wisconsin; (2) the
type of activities in which the State Bar should engage; (3) the appropriate means of financ-
ing the activities of the State Bar, including the extent to which continuing legal education
activities provide funds for other Bar activities; (4) the management of State Bar funds,
including budget development, accountability for expenditures, and the development and
use of surpluses.
Regulation of the Bar, 81 Wis. 2d xxxv.
105. State ex rel. Armstrong v. Board of Governors, 86 Wis. 2d 746, 751, 273 N.W.2d 356,
358 (1979) (quoting Regulation of the Bar, 81 Wis. 2d xxxvi (1977)).
106. Id. at 748, 273 N.W.2d at 357. The proposed referendum posed three questions; the last
one read as follows: "III. Should it be the policy of the State Bar to urge the Supreme Court to
take appropriate action to assist the orderly transformation of the mandatory character of the
State Bar to a voluntary association?" Id.
107. The Wisconsin Supreme Court excluded all three questions, stating that they pertained
to "court policy, not bar association policy." Id. at 751, 273 N.W.2d at 358. However, the court
did not explain why a matter for the court to decide could not be a policy issue on the agenda of
the State Bar. Id. at 749, 751, 273 N.W.2d at 357-58.
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Twice during the 1980s, the supreme court has appointed a committee
to review the question of the continued integration of the State Bar. The
decision reported in In re Discontinuation of the State Bar of Wisconsin as
an Integrated Bar' involved a petition by a group of lawyers requesting
the Wisconsin Supreme Court to make bar membership voluntary. The pe-
tition was filed in response to a vote of members of the Bar in which ap-
proximately sixty-percent of those voting favored a voluntary rather than
an integrated bar.109 After holding a public meeting on the issue, the
supreme court denied the petition.1 o In 1983, the supreme court appointed
another committee to review the performance of the State Bar."' Contin-
ued integration was one of the subjects considered by the comniittee. After
a public meeting on the issues, the supreme court decided to retain the inte-
grated bar but ruled that the use of membership dues for funding legislative
advocacy was improper." 2
III. INTELLECTUAL INDIVIDUALISM VS. COMPULSORY ASSOCIATION
The first amendment" 3 has been the guardian of a multitude of individ-
ual freedoms, including the freedom of association. 114 A corollary right,
which has been sometimes characterized as a "negative right,""' 5 is the free-
dom to not associate with organizations or ideologies. Encompassed within
this right have been claims by nonunion employees who were forced to be-
108. 93 Wis. 2d 385, 286 N.W.2d 601 (1980).
109. Id. at 386, 286 N.W.2d at 602.
110. Id. at 388, 286 N.W.2d at 603.
111. See Report of Committee to Review the State Bar, 112 Wis. 2d xix, 334 N.W.2d 544
(1983). The committee was known as the Kelly Committee, named after the committee chair,
John Kelly, a Milwaukee banker.
112. See id. at xxv, 334 N.W.2d at 549. The State Bar was only prohibited from supporting
political issues and candidates through its political action committee (LAWPAC). Id. It could
still engage in legislative advocacy on issues germane to improving the administration of justice.
However, in 1986, the supreme court developed a rebate procedure which permitted objectors to
deduct their pro rata share of dues expended for such legislative activities at the beginning of each
fiscal year. See SCR 10.03(5)(b) (1988); In re Amendment of State Bar Rules: SCR 10.03(5), 127
Wis. 2d xi (1986). Shortly thereafter, the board of governors adopted a by-law which provided for
an arbitration proceeding in the event a disagreement arose between the bar and a member con-
cerning allocation of expenditures to legislative activities. See Petition to Review State Bar By-
Law Amendments, 139 Wis. 2d 686, 407 N.W.2d 923 (1987).
113. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of people peaceably to assemble ...." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
114. The right of freedom of association was first addressed in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
115. See Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and
Association, 23 B.C.L. REv. 995, 996 (1982); Levine v. Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 679 F. Supp.
1478, 1489 (W.D. Wis. 1988), rev'd sub nom., Levine v. Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 204 (1989).
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come union members as a precondition of continued employment,116 or pay
dues to support union activities with which they disagree;' 17 or the claims
of students who were required to recite the pledge of allegiance when it was
repugnant to their religious beliefs. 18 Also within this category are a sub-
set of cases in which lawyers have challenged both compelled membership
in a bar association and use of membership dues for activities with which
they did not agree. 19 Together, all of these cases are commonly identified
with a principle known as "intellectual individualism."12 This principle
embodies the "right of self-determination in matters that touch individual
opinion and personal attitude."' 21 The extent to which the Court has been
willing to extend first amendment protection in light of this principle is
relevant to the integrated bar debate.
A. Framing the Fundamental Importance of Freedom of Choice
Several decisions of the Supreme Court have given credence to the prin-
ciple of intellectual freedom in the face of government coercion. For exam-
116. Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
117. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
118. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
119. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); Hollar v. Virgin Islands, 857 F.2d 163
(3rd Cir. 1988) (integrated bar does not violate first amendment when it expends funds to advance
causes germane to the purposes for which it was integrated); Gibson v. The Florida Bar, 798 F.2d
1564 (1 lth Cir. 1986) (bar could only expend funds on matters germane to the bar's stated pur-
poses); Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 682 F. Supp. 674 (D.P.R. 1988) (failure
to protect dissenters' rights makes compelled membership in bar association unconstitutional);
Levine, 679 F. Supp. at 1478 (mandatory bar membership is a constitutionally impermissible bur-
den on an individual's rights of association and speech); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Welke, 766
S.W.2d 633 (Ky. 1989); Falk v. State Bar of Michigan, 631 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Mich. 1986),
aff'd, 815 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1987); Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 565 F.
Supp. 963 (D.P.R. 1983), vacated and remanded sub nom., Romony v. Colegio de Abogados de
Puerto Rico, 742, F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1984); Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458 (D.N.M. 1982) (bar
may use dues to support only functions which serve important government functions); Keller v.
State Bar of California, 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 767 P.2d 1020, 255 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1989), cert. granted,
110 S. Ct. 46 (1989) (as a government agency, the bar can spend funds for any purpose within its
authority); Falk v. State Bar of Michigan, 411 Mich. 63, 305 N.W.2d 201 (1981), sub proceedings,
418 Mich. 270, 342 N.W.2d 504 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 925 (1984); Reynolds v. State Bar of
Montana, 660 P.2d 581 (Mont. 1983) (state bar may not use compulsory dues for lobbying unless
it makes refunds to dissenters); In re Chapman, 128 N.H. 24, 509 A.2d 753 (1986) (bar must
carefully tailor its position on legislative activities to limited issues within its constitutional man-
date in order to protect its members' individual rights).
120. Justice Jackson is considered the originator of this principle. He believed that no society
could benefit by efforts to compel unity and eliminate dissent. "We can have intellectual individu-
alism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occa-
sional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes." See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641-42.
121. Id. at 631.
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ple, West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette 122 concerned a resolution
adopted by the West Virginia Board of Education shortly after the begin-
ning of World War II. This resolution required public schools to include a
mandatory flag salute and the pledge of allegiance at the beginning of each
school day in which all students and teachers were required to partici-
pate.123 Any pupil who refused -to participate was deemed guilty of insub-
ordination and could be expelled. Additionally, the state would then be
permitted to bring a delinquency action against the parents."' The plain-
tiffs were three Jehovah's Witnesses who were parents of several students.
They argued that they could not be forced to violate their religious convic-
tions by allowing their children to participate in the mandatory flag sa-
lute.1 25 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the plurality
opinion did not focus on the principles of religious liberty. Rather, Justice
Jackson was concerned about the broader implications of government pre-
scribed orthodoxy. He stated:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to
US. 126
Of great importance to Justice Jackson was the extent to which govern-
ment authority could compel speech in a democratic system which guaran-
tees individual freedoms. 127 In light of the primacy of those democratic
122. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
123. Id. at 626 n.2.
124. See Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REv. 321, 341 (1979).
125. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629.
126. Id. at 642.
127. "There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or of the nature or origin of
its authority. We set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies
those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent." Id. at 641.
Whether Justice Jackson would totally prohibit compelled affirmation of a state-sponsored
idea is not clear from the Barnette opinion. However, more recent commentary suggests that
Justice Jackson adopted an absolutist's philosophy with respect to first amendment analysis. See
Gard, The Flag Salute Cases and the First Amendment, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 419, 422-24 (1982).
Professor Tribe sees Barnette as a case in which the focus of concern is on preventing an invasion
of the right of personhood. Freedom of expression is in part "an expression of the sort of society
we wish to become and the sort of persons we wish to be .... " L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 12-I, at 576 (1978). Professor Emerson has similar notions. He stated that the
ultimate justification for freedom of expression relates to the right of an individual as an individual
to develop his own personality and realize his own potential free from government influence. T.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8-11 (1963).
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freedoms, he determined that the compulsory flag salute statute violated the
first amendment rights of the three plaintiffs. 128
In American Communications Association v. Douds,12 9 the Court upheld
the constitutionality of a section of the Taft-Hartley Act, which required
that union officers file an affidavit stating that they were not communists
and did not support the overthrow of the United States government.1 30
Union officials who refused to comply with this law were denied numerous
benefits which were available through the National Labor Relations Act.
Unlike the compelled affirmative speech found in Barnette, this case in-
volved compelled disclosure of political affiliations and beliefs. Although
Justice Jackson agreed that disclosure of political affiliation was appropri-
ate, he objected to the requirement that union officers sign the affidavit dis-
avowing any belief which they may have had with respect to overthrowing
the government.13 1  Justice Jackson reaffirmed his belief that the first
amendment protects the "realm of opinion and ideas, beliefs and doubts,
heresy and orthodoxy, political, religious or scientific. 1 32  Essentially,
Douds and Barnette concerned themselves with high-sounding democratic
values; freedom from government-compelled ideas as a necessary precondi-
tion for avoiding forced conformity and protection of the individual's inter-
est in "selfhood."' 133
Subsequently, the Supreme Court expanded the reach of those first
amendment values in Wooley v. Maynard.13 4 In Wooley, the Court found
that the plaintiff, a Jehovah's Witness, could not be compelled to display
New Hampshire's state motto "Live Free or Die" on his license plates.1 35
Unlike the flag salute in Barnette and the affidavit in Douds, the coerced
behavior in Wooley was incidental since the plaintiff's involvement with the
state motto was something less than coerced speech, and because the associ-
ation between the plaintiff and the motto was not one that would make the
world believe that they were advocates of the motto. 136 Nevertheless, the
128. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
129. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
130. Id. at 411-12.
131. Douds, 339 U.S. at 435-36, 442 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. Id. at 443.
133. See TRIBE, supra note 127, § 15-1, at 889.
134. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
135. The plaintiff in Wooley covered the objectionable message with tape but subsequently
was convicted of a misdemeanor for "knowingly [obscuring] . . . the figures or letters on any
number plate." Id. at 707 (quoting N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 262:27-c (Supp. 1975)).
136. Tribe suggests that the Court's decision may have aggravated this problem. When the
New Hampshire law was in effect, no one who saw the motto seriously believed that a person
displaying the message would die for his freedom. Yet, after the Court's decision, Tribe argues
that everyone in New Hampshire was forced to take a public stance on the motto: If the person
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Court determined that New Hampshire's actions constituted promotion of
a state-sponsored ideology which was repugnant to the "sphere of intellect
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitu-
tion to reserve from all official control."' 13 7 As such, the Court found that
the mandated display of the state motto intruded upon the plaintiff's first
amendment rights. 138
While Barnette and Douds were primarily a response to the fear of state-
driven orthodoxy undercutting the incentive to promote nonconforming
ideas, Wooley was an "appeal... to the vindication of individual personal-
ity."' 139 Together, these cases capsulize two distinct ways in which govern-
ment-compelled expression may infringe upon the individual's interest in
"selfhood." First, compelled expression may interfere with the individual's
right to define his public persona. 14° In this respect, compelled affirmation
exposes a person's true views to the world or creates a misrepresentation in
the public forum of what the individual believes.' 41 Second, compelled ex-
pression can infringe upon the individual's freedom of conscience. 142 Un-
like the latter circumstance which concerns how an individual may present
himself to the public, "the interest in freedom of conscience focuses on the
individual's self-perception."'' 4 3
The infringement occurs when an individual views compliance with the
compelled message as acquiescence or agreement with its principles.
Hence, individuals who submit to compulsory affirmation are likely to feel
humiliation and disgrace when they are incapable of disassociating them-
left the license plate unaltered, you were a freedom lover; if the person covered it up, he was a
Jehovah's Witness. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-5, at 901 n.16 (1978).
137. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (quoting West Virginia Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943)).
138. Id. at 716-17. The state argued that the requirement of compelled participation facili-
tated the identification of passenger vehicles because the motto was said to aid police in determin-
ing if the vehicle was properly licensed. Id. at 716. Secondly, it promoted "appreciation of
history, individualism and state pride." Id. at 717. The Court determined that these assertions
were not sufficient to outweigh the infringement of the plaintiff's interests because vehicle license
plates were already distinguishable and there were other ways to promote history and pride which
would be less restrictive. Id.
139. Harpaz, Justice Jackson's Flag Salute Legacy: The Supreme Court Struggles to Protect
Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEx. L. REv. 817, 854 (1986). "Although the state's message did
not create any pressure to conform, displaying that message made them feel like traitors to their
belief system." Id. at 854-55.
140. See Gaebler, supra note 115, at 1004.
141. Id. at 1005.
142. Id. at 1004.
143. Id. at 1005.
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selves from the state's message. 1" Although the Supreme Court has not
specifically delineated the freedom of conscience in the face of compulsory
affirmation, Wooley personifies the Court's willingness to protect individu-
ally held beliefs, even when the state does not directly interfere with the
way the individual projects oneself to the public.
The incidental intrusiveness in Wooley can be likened to compulsory
membership in state bars. Just as the mere existence of the state's message
on the license plate did not create any pressure to conform, the mere pay-
ment of an annual membership fee has also been characterized as minimally
intrusive.1 45 But in order for the integrated bar to be a functioning body, it
must be allowed the freedom to carry on its business and make decisions
which relate to "furthering the administration of justice" or "serving the
public interest." Into these broad categories fall numerous issues that are
inherently political in nature and carry with them varying viewpoints, de-
pending on the political disposition of individual lawyers. It is impractical
to think that a state bar could accommodate the views of every lawyer when
it engages in legislative advocacy. Hence, lawyers are compelled to be
members of an association which can take positions that are adverse to the
personal beliefs of some of its members.
To many, the constitutional burdens posed by this circumstance are al-
most trivial. As the connection between the message and the individual
becomes more attenuated, it not only becomes less likely that others will
attribute the views to a particular lawyer, but it is also less likely that the
individual lawyer will view compulsory membership as acquiescence. 146
The inherent difficulty is to ascertain when a member no longer considers
involuntary involvement as an affront on freedom of conscience. The reso-
lution of this problem necessarily invokes a subjective determination of each
and every individual's tolerance to compelled association. Since no court
can say with absolute certainty whether one person or another would find
certain activities objectionable, a judicial determination may not be possi-
ble. Realizing that the myriad of strong convictions of lawyers will never
144. Id. "[S]tate... compel[led] expression constitutes a direct and powerful affront to the
individual as an individual because it requires a denial of the self and represents the ultimate
submission of the individual - submission of mind." Id.
145. The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted in Lathrop v. Donohue that the unified bar does
not:
compel the plaintiff to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend its meet-
ings or vote in its elections as he chooses .... He is free ... to voice his views on any
subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views be diametrically opposed to a
position taken by the State Bar.
Lathrop v. Donohue, 230, 237, 102 N.W.2d 404, 408 (1960), aff'd, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
146. See Gaebler, supra note 115, at 1013-14.
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consistently be in harmony, the assumption is that a compulsory association
will always pose a first amendment infringement on the individual's free-
dom of conscience. The only measure for justifying any infringement,
therefore, becomes an analysis of the need for such compulsory affirmation
in the face of the constitutional infringement. In Wooley, preservation of
individual identity was deemed more important than the state-sponsored
purposes for which the compulsory participation was required. 47 Whether
equal deference will be accorded to the first amendment infringement in the
integrated bar remains to be seen.
B. The Residual Effect of Compelled Association: Compelled Disclosure
Dissenters in a compulsory association are in a difficult position. Either
they remain silent and risk having the association's speech be interpreted as
their own, or they openly disavow it and thereby relinquish their right to
silence. Such a problem was recognized by the Supreme Court in
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins. 4 8 In that case, the Court upheld a
state court interpretation of the state constitution permitting high school
students to solicit petitions declaring opposition to a United Nations resolu-
tion against Zionism on the premises of a privately owned shopping mall. 49
The owner objected to the state's mandate that he provide a forum for
third-parties to express their views. 150 Although a majority of the Court
agreed that there was no merit to this claim,'51 a concurring opinion by
Justice Powell suggested that a better first amendment challenge could have
been brought by the mall owner if he argued that the state, by granting the
right of access, would in effect compel the owner to speak out in opposition
to the views being expressed on the property.1 52 Powell suggested that such
compelled disclosure could arise even if no confusion existed as to the
source of the message, if the property owner found the ideas expressed so
objectionable that he, in good conscience, could not remain silent. 53
147. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
148. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
149. Id. at 77-78, 88.
150. Id. at 85-88.
151. The Supreme Court determined that Wooley was distinguishable for three reasons.
First, the government itself was not disseminating any particular message in the shopping center;
rather, it was granting the public access so that they could display whatever messages they chose.
Id. at 87. Second, the state law in Wooley forbade the Maynards from covering up the motto,
while the mall owner could disavow any connection with the message by "simply posting signs."
Id. Finally, unlike the Maynard's automobile, the shopping center was open to the public, thus
making it unlikely that the student-disseminated message would be taken to represent the views of
the owner. Id.
152. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 100 (Powell, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 99.
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Justice Powell continued this theme in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub-
lic Utilities Commission,'54 a case in which the Court reviewed the constitu-
tionality of a California Public Utilities Commission order directing the
Pacific Gas & Electric Company to periodically insert political editorials
which advanced the views of a group which objected to the utility rates.1 55
The constitutional challenge was prompted by Pacific Gas' practice of dis-
tributing a newsletter along with monthly billings, the content of which was
deemed political in nature. Pacific Gas appealed the Commission's decision
to the Supreme Court claiming the order mandated dissemination of a polit-
ical message with which it disagreed. In a plurality opinion, the Court re-
versed the Commission's order.'56 Justice Powell's opinion emphasized
that the right not to speak served the same societal purposes as the right to
speak since both assure that public debate on public issues would be vigor-
ous.157 Declaring open access on the billing statement as punishment for
expressing certain views would tend to inhibit expression since the speaker
would opt for silence rather than accept the penalty. 158
The Court's concern about a person's protected right of silence poses
difficulties for integrated bars. Although proponents of bar integration ar-
gue "that one of the advantages of an integrated bar is that it represents a
diversity of viewpoints," 159 representation in a voluntary bar association
could be viewed similarly. Freedom to express views on policy matters is
present in both organizations. But in addition to expression of viewpoints,
members of voluntary associations have the option to remain silent, know-
ing that if they disagree with a bar decision, they can disavow the decision
by quitting. This avenue is foreclosed to lawyers in integrated bars. Conse-
quently, if an attorney feels strongly about an issue, the only personal satis-
faction that he can hope to gain is by disclosing his true views, though he
may be reluctant to do so. This result seems contrary to Powell's opinions
in Pacific Gas & Electric and Pruneyard and may also be in contravention to
the Court's holding in Wooley and Barnette which emphasized the vindica-
tion of personal beliefs from coerced expression.' 60
154. 475 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1133 (1986).
155. Id. at 4.
156. Id. at 20-21.
157. Id. at 8-9.
158. Id. at 10-11.
159. See Levine, 679 F. Supp. at 1496.
160. See supra notes 122-47 and accompanying text.
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C "'Fee Speech"
Attorneys have attacked the constitutional propriety of the integrated
bar on two first amendment grounds: freedom of association and freedom
of speech. Although these vestiges of the first amendment are interrelated,
the freedom of association argument has typically been utilized to attack
the very idea of compulsory membership, while the freedom of speech argu-
ment has commonly been used to challenge specific bar activities, particu-
larly legislative lobbying. Numerous lawsuits have been brought, both
inside and outside the context of the integrated bar, which have challenged
the use of compulsory membership dues for activities which individual
members may oppose.1 61 Unfortunately, the response of the courts has gen-
erally been insufficient to resolve all the problems connected with expendi-
tures of compulsory fees. Although the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to discuss this issue in Lathrop, it nevertheless declined to ad-
dress the problem.1 62 Still, the compelled financial support issue has been
addressed by the Court on several occasions in the labor union context.
1. Union Shops
The opinions in Lathrop continually reference an analogous relationship
between an integrated bar and a union shop.1 63 A typical "union shop"
requires that workers in a particular field become members of a union and
161. The payment of compulsory membership dues has been likened to the payment of taxes
by citizens, or to mandatory student fees paid by most college students. For the most part, the tax
argument has been rejected by the courts because the dues are spent for the benefit of only a
segment of the population. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring); Levine, 679
F. Supp. at 1498. But see Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional Inter-
ests in Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. Rnv. 3, 22-25 (1983) (Compulsory member-
ship groups are nearly identical to government entities, thus dues expenditures are similar to
taxes.). Not much litigation has addressed the comparison between student fees and mandatory
bar fees, although they are similar in some respects and different in other ways. Neither type of
fee requires the payor to participate in any activity, and the chance of any message being identified
with the payor is small. However, there are major differences. First, students are not required to
be members of any association and there is no penalty as such for not joining, which is unlike the
integrated bar, where the penalty is being barred from practicing law. Second, in many cases,
most student fees are not used to support politically-related activities. Moreover, a student denied
admission for failure to pay has less of a burden than a lawyer who must move to another state
and pass a bar exam before he is allowed to practice law. For an informative discussion on stu-
dent fees, see generally Wells, Mandatory Student Fees: First Amendment Concerns and University
Discretion, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 363 (1988); Comment, "Fee Speech:" First Amendment Limita-
tions on Student Fee Expenditures, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 279, 292-95 (1984).
162. Writing for the plurality, Justice Brennan refused to "intimate [any] view as to the cor-
rectness of the conclusion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that the appellant may constitutionally
be compelled to contribute... to political activities which he opposes." Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 847-
48.
163. Id. at 842, 871, 879.
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financially support its causes, including political and legislative activities, as
a prerequisite for continued employment in that particular field. 1" Fur-
ther, compulsory union membership is authorized by the state through stat-
utory provision.16
5
The analogous relationship between the integrated bar and the union
shop was first recognized by Justice Douglas in Railway Employes' Depart-
ment v. Hanson.1 66 In Hanson, the Court upheld the validity of the union
shop provisions of the Railway Labor Act 167 against charges that the union
shop agreement forced workers into political associations which violated
their freedom of association. Emphasizing that the only condition to union
membership authorized by the statute was the payment of "periodic dues,
initiation fees, and assessments,"' 16 and that the only support required of
members was financial support related to the work of the union in the realm
of collective bargaining, the Court held that the union shop agreement was
no more of an infringement or impairment of first amendment rights than a
state law which required all lawyers to be members of an integrated bar.
1 69
Hanson has been criticized on a number of grounds, not the least of
which was the Court's failure to give sufficient weight to the first amend-
ment concerns raised in the case. 170 Additionally, Hanson left unanswered
questions concerning the use of compulsory membership dues to support
activities other than collective bargaining.
1 7 1
The Court was confronted with the latter issue again in International
Association of Machinists v. Street.1 72 In Street, labor unions, which had
negotiated union shop agreements pursuant to the union shop authorization
164. Comment, The Compelled Contribution in the Integrated Bar and the All Union Shop,
1962 Wis. L. REV. 138, 148.
165. Id.
166. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
167. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 477 (1926) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 152
(1976)).
168. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 229.
169. Id. at 238. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Douglas noted: "On the present
record, there is no more an infringement or impairment of First Amendment rights than there
would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a member of an integrated bar."
Id. However, in Lathrop, Justice Douglas retracted his statement, noting that "on reflection the
analogy fails." Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 879 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
170. Bond, The National Labor Relations Act and the Forgotten First Amendment, 28 S.C.L.
REV. 421, 436 (1977); see also Comment, First Amendment Proscriptions on the Integrated Bar:
Lathrop v. Donohue Re-Examined, 22 ARiz. L. REV. 939, 958-59 (1980) (Hanson misapplied by
the Supreme Court in Lathrop).
171. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238.
172. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
[Vol. 73:144
STATE BAR MEMBERSHIP
in the Railway Labor Act, 173 expended union funds in support of political
activities to which the plaintiffs were opposed. The Court said that the use
of exacted funds, over an employee's objection, to support political causes,
was a use falling outside the reasons advanced by the unions and Congress
for creating union shop agreements. 174 However, the Court avoided the
issue pertaining to the constitutionality of using compulsory dues to sup-
port political activities with which an employee disagrees.175 It also specifi-
cally declined to make a constitutional determination concerning the
allocation of membership dues for purposes unrelated to collective bargain-
ing and political activities.'76 Interestingly, the very same issues were
before the Court in Lathrop, which was decided the same day as Street, and
the Court still declined to articulate any position on those issues.
177
2. Agency Shops
Uncertainty remained in the area of freedom of speech until the Court
decided Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.178 The appellants in Abood
were public school teachers who challenged the constitutionality of a Mich-
igan law' 7 9 which authorized a union and a government employer to agree
to an agency shop.' 80 Under the agreement, a nonunion teacher would be
required, as a precondition for employment, to contribute a fee equivalent
to union dues to the union. 81 Initially, the Court addressed the coextensive
relationship between free speech and making financial contributions to sup-
port chosen views. In Buckley v. Valeo, 1s2 the Court held that financial
173. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 477 (1926) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 152
(1976)).
174. Street, 367 U.S. at 768.
175. The Supreme Court relied on the doctrine that "[w]hen the validity of an act of the
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided." Id. at 749 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 62 (1932)).
176. Id. at 769-70.
177. See generally Comment, Freedom from Political Association: The Street and Lathrop
Decisions, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 777 (1962); Note, Impact of Lathrop v. Donohue and Int'l Assrn of
Machinists v. Street Upon the Expenditures of Associations, 10 UCLA L. REV. 390 (1963).
178. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
179. MICH. COMp. LAWS § 423.210 (1970).
180. Agency shop requires the payment of a fixed monthly fee to the union as a condition of
employment regardless of whether the payer is a member of the union in order to reimburse the
union for costs of representation. This is different from a union shop, which requires the employ-
ees to join the union as a condition of employment. See Mitchell, Public Sector Union Security:
The Impact of Abood, 29 LAB. L.J. 697 (1978).
181. Abood, 431 U.S. at 211.
182. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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contributions to political campaigns were a form of speech which merited
first amendment protection. 18 3 Consequently, the Abood Court determined
that requiring a contribution used to promote an idea opposed by the con-
tributor constituted compelled support for an idea.'" 4 Invoking the teach-
ings of Barnette, the Court concluded that the right of non-association' 85
would protect employees from being required to financially support an ideo-
logical cause they may oppose as a condition of public employment." 6
Funds could only be allocated to activities germane to collective
bargaining. 1
87
Lawyers have since argued that the mandatory dues issue in Abood was
conceptually identical to the issue reserved in Lathrop, and therefore,
"Abood is substantially determinative on the question of the constitutional-
ity of an attorney's use of compulsory dues for causes to which the attorney
objects."' 8 Moreover, at least one commentator has suggested that Abood
may spell doom for compulsory bar membership itself.'89
IV. THE NEW "FRONTAL ATTACK"' 90 ON THE BAR: LEVINE V.
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
A. Opinion of the District Court
The decision rendered in Levine v. Supreme Court of Wisconsin 191 is
significant in several respects. In the entire sixty-seven year history of the
integrated bar, this was the first time a state reverted to voluntary bar sta-
183. Id. at 21-23.
184. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35.
185. This was the first time the Court clearly established that freedom of association entailed
the right not to be associated through financial support with a private group's promotion of be-
liefs. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 57.
186. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235.
187. Id. at 236.
188. See Sorenson, supra note 16, at 54.
189. Professor Schneyer has stated:
To be sure, Lathrop explicitly upheld compulsory bar membership. But it may have done
so only because the Wisconsin State Bar had not been shown to engage in any activity for
which compulsory dues could not be used. If lawyers cannot be forced to "associate"
themselves with bar lobbying positions by providing financial support... it will take no
great constitutional leap to find that they also cannot be forced to "associate" with those
positions through membership.
See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 67 (footnote omitted); see also Comment, Arrow v. Dow: The
Legacy of Lathrop - State Bars Under Attack, 8 OKLA. CITY U.L. REv. 89, 110 (1983).
190. See Marcotte, Mandatory Bars Shaken, 74 A.B.A. J. 36 (Oct. 1988) (comments of
Wisconsin State Bar President John Walsh).
191. 679 F. Supp. 1478 (W.D. Wis. 1988), rev'd sub nom., Levine v. Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457
(7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 204 (1989).
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tUS. 19 2 More importantly, this was a prototype decision in integrated bar
litigation. It recognized that more recent freedom of association cases may
have implicated the mandatory bar as constitutionally suspect. Further, the
case suggests that changes in the character of the Wisconsin Bar have made
Lathrop v. Donohue193 inapplicable.
In 1986, Steven Levine, a Wisconsin lawyer, filed suit in federal district
court challenging the constitutionality of the integrated bar.194 Levine ar-
gued that his first amendment rights of association and speech were violated
by Wisconsin's mandatory bar membership requirement. 9 Alternatively,
he argued that if mandatory bar membership was constitutional, the use of
his membership dues to fund political and ideological activities was
unconstitutional. 196
With respect to the first issue, the district court began by framing the
importance of the first amendment infringements, reasoning that the es-
sence of the right of individual choice involves "the decision not to do
something as well as the decision to do something." 197 Consistent with that
reasoning, Judge Crabb ascertained that the first amendment could protect
the plaintiff's right not to join the bar. However, Judge Crabb also noted
that the right to associate and not to associate was not absolute; that gov-
ernment can and has infringed upon the protected rights of individuals.98
Permissible infringements were justified by an analysis of the govern-
mental interest in the regulation and the individual right to speech and as-
sociation. This "balancing test" was first described in Douds,199 but as the
district court noted, when the Court reweighed the conflicting interests, it
did not attribute more weight to the individual right in issue as it had done
previously in Barnette." However, Judge Crabb determined that in recent
cases the Supreme Court has been more protective of first amendment
rights by requiring that infringements on the right to associate be justified
192. Shortly after Levine was decided, another district court determined that the integrated
bar was unconstitutional. See Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados, 682 F. Supp. 674 (D.P.R.
1988).
193. 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d 404 (1960), aff'd, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
194. Plaintiff brought the action in federal court, alleging jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982). Levine, 679 F. Supp. at 1479.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1479-80.
197. Id. at 1490.
198. Id.; see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 457 U.S. 503 (1986); Members of the City Council
of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
199. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).




by regulations which serve a compelling state interest.20 1 Further, the in-
fringement must be the least restrictive means available to achieve the com-
pelling state interest.20 2
Nonetheless, it is unnecessary for the test to be applied if the first
amendment infringement is de minimus. 2°3 The district court noted that
mandatory membership in the State Bar of Wisconsin only consisted of the
payment of dues and that the Supreme Court in Lathrop did not consider
such payments to be a significant infringement on Lathrop's right not to
associate. 2°4 However, Judge Crabb read more recent decisions of the
Court as suggesting that mere payment of dues was a significant infringe-
ment on the first amendment. For example, Judge Crabb cited Wooley 205
and Pacific Gas & Electric206 as indications that the Court had not re-
stricted the definition of compelled association to the identification of an
individual with views he does not share; the focus was on the idea of com-
pulsion itself.20 7 Additionally, Judge Crabb raised the issue of compelled
disclosure, citing to Justice Powell's opinions in Pruneyard and Pacific Gas
& Electric.208
As for the mandatory payment of dues, the district court once again
looked to modem case law to refute the Supreme Court's conclusion in
Lathrop that mandatory payment of dues was similar to the payment of
taxes and, therefore, the infringement occasioned by compulsory payments
was insignificant.20 9 Critical to the district court's analysis was Buckley v.
Valeo.2" ° In Buckley, the Supreme Court held that financial contributions
to political campaigns constituted protected speech and that mandated limi-
tations on political contributions were unconstitutional. The Court found
that the legislative limitations on financial contributions imposed restric-
tions on "political communication and association., 21' Judge Crabb found
Buckley to extend beyond the realm of political speech and concluded that
compelled payment of contributions likewise infringed on the freedoms of
association and speech.212 Further support for this view was found in
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1494 (citing Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)).
204. Id.
205. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
206. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
207. Levine, 679 F. Supp. at 1495.
208. Id. at 1495-96.
209. Id. at 1496.
210. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
211. Id. at 18.
212. Levine, 679 F. Supp. at 1496-97.
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Abood,213 where Judge Crabb found key language of the Supreme Court
opinion as suggesting that the Court had abandoned the Lathrop rationale
that the payment of dues was an insignificant first amendment
infringement.214
In addition to the first amendment considerations, the plaintiff in Levine
also contended that Lathrop was no longer determinative because the facts
upon which the Supreme Court based its decision had changed.215 The dis-
trict court, in addressing this argument, perceived that the majority of the
Lathrop Court was influenced primarily by the Bar's quasi-public involve-
ment in "elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar.2216
Noting the Bar's diminished role in those areas, Judge Crabb concluded
that Lathrop was factually distinguishable and therefore not determinative
on the issues presented.217
Since Lathrop was no longer dispositive, the district court applied a
compelling state interest analysis and determined that the Bar activities
which were supported by mandatory dues did not constitute a compelling
state interest.218 Further, the State Bar did not show that compulsory
membership was the least restrictive means of achieving its goals.219 For
these reasons, compulsory bar membership was rendered
unconstitutional.220
B. Seventh Circuit Reversal
The principal issue on appeal was whether Lathrop controlled the out-
come of the Levine decision.2 21 In a rather cursory opinion, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment of
the district court.222 Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Flaum ad-
213. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
214. To be required to help finance the union as a collective-bargaining agent might well be
thought, therefore, to interfere in some way with an employee's freedom to associate for the
advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit. But the judgment in
Hanson and Street is that such interference as exists is constitutionally justified by the
legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the system of
labor relations established by Congress.
Levine, 679 F. Supp. at 1497 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977) (emphasis in text)).
215. Id. at 1491.
216. Id. at 1492.
217. Id. at 1493.
218. Levine, 679 F. Supp. at 1501.
219. Id. at 1501-02.
220. Id. at 1502.
221. Levine v. Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 204
(1989).
222. Id. at 463.
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dressed what he perceived to be two alternative premises advanced by the
district court. The first premise was that "Lathrop has been implicitly over-
ruled by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. '2 / 3 Initially, the court noted
that for Lathrop to have been implicitly overruled, it must be satisfied that
"this is one of those rare cases where circumstances 'have created a near
certainty that only the occasion is needed for the pronouncement [by the
Supreme Court] of the doom' of an obsolete doctrine." '24 The court of
appeals could find no circumstances which satisfied this criteria.2 5 Fur-
ther, the court of appeals believed that the cases cited by the district court
did not cast any doubt on the validity of Lathrop.
Judge Flaum focused primarily on the cases which involved the com-
pelled financial support prong of the first amendment infringement. Specifi-
cally, he believed that Judge Crabb's interpretation of Buckley was too
broad, asserting that the compelling state interest test was applicable only
when "core first amendment activity is involved." '26 Compelled financial
support of the Bar was apparently not considered core first amendment ac-
tivity. The court of appeals also distinguished Abood and Ellis v. Brother-
hood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, z7 concluding that the
compulsory contribution requirements were significant first amendment in-
fringements and were dicta.22 8 Judge Flaum restricted the compelling state
interest analysis in Abood.and Ellis to cases which involved the funding of
certain activities with compulsory dues payment and not the very fact of
compelled membership itself, which he believed was resolved in Lathrop.229
Concluding that Lathrop was still good law, the court of appeals next
sought to determine whether the holding of that case was applicable to the
facts of Levine. Judge Flaum asserted that "[i]f Wisconsin's present inte-
grated bar is substantially similar to its predecessor, Lathrop compels us to
conclude that it serves a legitimate state interest. '23 ° The court of appeals
223. Id. at 460.
224. Id. at 461 (quoting Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 734
(7th Cir. 1986)).
225. In his analysis, Judge Flaum found that no Supreme Court justice had questioned the
validity of Lathrop and that lower courts had followed the Lathrop precedent. Id. at 461 (citing
Hollar v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 857 F.2d 163 (3rd Cir. 1988); Gibson v. Florida Bar,
798 F.2d 1564 (1 1th Cir. 1986)). Finally, because Lathrop was the only precedent in the inte-
grated bar area, the district court had to analogize the bar to a union shop in order to reach its
conclusion. This policy of employing an analogy to overrule a higher court precedent would
undermine the doctrine of stare decisis. Levine, 864 F.2d at 461.
226. Id. at 462.
227. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).





noted the diminished role of the State Bar of Wisconsin in attorney disci-
pline and continuing legal education but concluded that the Supreme Court
in Lathrop placed no special emphasis on those activities.231 Consequently,
the court of appeals recognized that the district court overemphasized the
Bar's role in ethics and education. Finding the State Bar indistinguishable
from the one presented to the Court in Lathrop, the court of appeals re-
versed the district court decision.232
C. Questions Unanswered
Although the decision of the court of appeals was intended to correct
what it felt was an aberration in the law, its summary opinion was defective
in several respects. First, although the court of appeals ascertained that
Lathrop was still good law, it conceded Judge Crabb's argument that in
order for Lathrop to apply, the current Wisconsin bar must be "substan-
tially similar to its ... predecessor. '233 The only two activities which the
court of appeals addressed in its comparison of the two bars was their mu-
tual involvement in continuing legal education and ethics. Perhaps this ap-
proach was justified since those were the only two bar activities which the
district court gave notable mention to in its analysis. 234 However, other
modifications to the Wisconsin State Bar were neglected, which, if applied
in a comparative analysis, could realistically distinguish the modern State
Bar from the State Bar in the Lathrop decision.2 35 Nevertheless, the failure
231. Id.
232. Levine, 864 F.2d at 463.
233. Id. at 462.
234. See Levine v. Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 679 F. Supp. 1478, 1492-93 (1988).
235. The court of appeals did recognize, albeit in a footnote, that the Supreme Court in Lath-
rop noted the multifaceted character of the Wisconsin State Bar. See Levine v. Heffernan, 864
F.2d at 462 n. 11. However, as Professor Schneyer has suggested, a majority of the Court viewed
the state bar as a public agency created to fund and administer regulatory programs. See
Schneyer, supra note 20, at 54-55. Most certainly then, the Bar's involvement in discipline and
education were influential factors in the Court's decision. In support of this argument, the Court
did consider noteworthy the Bar's "major role in the State's procedures for the discipline of mem-
bers of the bar for unethical conduct." Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 830. The Court also found that
"[t]he most extensive activities of the State Bar are those directed toward post-graduate education
of lawyers." Id. at 839 (quoting Lathrop, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 246, 102 N.W.2d 404 412 (1960)).
However, the Bar's diminished role in discipline and education are not the only noteworthy
changes.
First, in the area of unauthorized practice of law, the committee by-law pertaining to that
subject stated in part: "The committee shall seek the elimination of such unauthorized practice
and participation therein on the part of members of the bar, by such action and methods as may
be appropriate for that purpose." Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 831 n.7. Currently, the unauthorized
practice of law is a statutory violation, which can only be enforced by the state Attorney General
or a district attorney. See Wis. STAT. § 757.30 (1987-88). The State Bar has petitioned the Wis-
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of the court of appeals to make a clear determination on the factual applica-
bility of Lathrop to the modem Bar casts doubt on the utility of that deci-
sion. Further, the court of appeals itself may not be sure where Lathrop
stands. At one point in the opinion it stated that "since Lathrop was de-
cided, the character of the Wisconsin Bar has changed considerably.
2 36
The disposition of the case, however, suggests a contrary view.
Second, the court of appeals did not make a complete response to the
first amendment arguments raised by the district court. Particularly, it ne-
glected to comment on the district court's comparison of Wooley, a freedom
of nonassociation case where the degree of state infringement was low, to
the minimal infringement posed by compulsory bar membership. Addition-
ally, it made no attempt to reconcile the district court's application of the
compelled disclosure argument raised in Pruneyard and Pacific Gas &
Electric.
The court of appeals' narrow construction of the holding in Abood is
also problematic. Judge Flaum asserted that Abood only applied to the use
of mandatory dues for certain activities and not to the issue of compulsory
membership, which he noted had already been put to rest in Hanson.237
consin Supreme Court twice during the 1980s to designate the Bar as an official decision maker
concerning unauthorized practice but the court denied both petitions.
Second, although the State Bar has maintained a standing committee on legislation, the proce-
dures with regard to position-taking have changed since Lathrop. See supra text accompanying
notes 75-81.
Third, the State Bar continues to maintain a committee on professional ethics. According to
the Lathrop bylaw, however, the committee was required to "formulate and recommend standards
and methods for the effective enforcement of high standards of ethics and conduct in the practice
of law." Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 829-30 n.7. The committees' influence on ethics in Wisconsin legal
practice has been insubstantial. The committee has not promulgated any standards currently in
use in the state. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has deferred to the ABA model standards in
ethics. Further, although the committee publishes ethics opinions in the Wisconsin Lawyer, those
opinions are not binding on any lawyer.
Fourth, at the time of Lathrop, a standing committee existed which pertained to judicial selec-
tion. Subsequently, this was merged with the committee on administration of justice. Although
the stated purposes have remained essentially the same, the Bar has significantly curtailed its
involvement in the judicial selection process. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
The Bar does have several other responsibilities not recognized in Lathrop. Supreme Court
Rule 12.01 creates a Client Security Fund to reimburse losses to the public caused by dishonest
lawyers. The fund is currently managed by the State Bar, but is funded by an assessment on
lawyers separate from bar dues.
Lawyers are also required to place client's funds in trust accounts pursuant to SCR 11.05
(repealed June 10, 1987, effective Jan. 1, 1988). Information concerning those accounts must be
reported to the State Bar on the lawyer's annual dues statement. The State Bar, in turn, provides
that information upon request when the BAPR receives a complaint against a lawyer. Essentially,
the Bar's function here is ministerial.
236. Levine, 864 F.2d at 458.
237. Id. at 462.
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The reasoning is anomalous because the compelling government interest in-
volved in Hanson and Abood, preserving industrial peace, is only applicable
to union shops and not to bar associations. If the purposes themselves are
dissimilar, then perhaps it is the compelling government interest that they
share. Assuming the accuracy of that statement, does the Court's applica-
tion of the union shop analogy to the bar necessarily mandate the existence
of some compelling interest?z38 This seems consistent with the Court's
holding in Lathrop, since at that time the Wisconsin State Bar was vested
with greater regulatory power over the bar than it currently possesses. Un-
fortunately, the Court has not assessed the governmental interest in the in-
tegrated bar since that time.
V. LAW, POLITICS, AND THE VIABILITY OF THE MANDATORY BAR
Whether compulsory membership in the bar is proper ultimately de-
pends on individual perceptions of the bar itself. To the lawyer that per-
ceives the bar as being charged with the maintenance and betterment of
justice, integration would be a benefit. Activities and proposals advanced
by the bar are seen as neutral in character, addressing strictly technical
legal issues which transcend the political arena. To the lawyer who views
bar activities as very political, compulsory association is deemed offensive.
However, the integrated bar does not require the "politics" lawyer to
associate with views with which he does not agree. He is only expected to
pay membership dues. This is constitutionally permissible in light of the
purposes for which the integrated bar was established. Nevertheless, these
purposes may be too amorphous to justify compulsory membership because
many activities which are political can fall under a general descriptive
phrase such as "to further the administration of justice." z 9 Succinctly
stated, "[t]he unified bar's problem lies in its inherently confused legal and
238. Judge Crabb determined that the Supreme Court, by its holdings in the union shop
context, has implied that unified bars must be justified by a compelling state interest. See Levine
v. Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 679 F. Supp. at 1500.
239. Justices on the Supreme Court recognized this problem at oral argument in Lathrop. At
one point, oral argument focused on a denial by Mr. Gordon Synkin, counsel for the State Bar,
that the integrated bar was like a political party:
CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: ... Take the number of judges a county should have. That
is a rather political thing .... Also, the question of how much judges should be paid is
more or less a political thing ....
MR. SINYKIN: I do not think they are political activities ....
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: But they are activities in connection with the passage of legisla-
tion on which people differ, on which they frequently have differences ....
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: Suppose somebody were to make a proposal ...
before the bar ... to change your constitution so as to give to the state judges ... life
tenure.... Can you think of a more politically charged question than that?
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political status, which has trapped the institution in an increasingly destruc-
tive cross-fire [sic] of values." 2" This condition has disabled the integrated
bar's effectiveness and versatility.24'
Reverting to voluntary bar status is a feasible alternative for several rea-
sons. First, there are no legal or political identity problems. The voluntary
bar is a private organization, not a public agency or a compulsory member-
ship group. Second, voluntary bar membership would be consensual, thus
eliminating internal disruption by dissident lawyers. In turn, this would
give the bar flexibility in both revenue gathering and in legislative advocacy.
More importantly, without a legislature or court constantly looking over its
shoulder, the voluntary bar would essentially be an autonomous
association.
The State Bar of Wisconsin will lose very little by remaining volun-
tary. 42 Regulation of attorney discipline and competence is already the
responsibility of independent agencies. Moreover, those agencies and the
CLE program are already funded by separate assessments on lawyers.
After some further argument on what is a political matter, Justice Frankfurter summed up his
position by saying:
You cannot rest this case on a nice line between what is political and what is not political
insofar as the bar as a corporate body in your state may express its views. I do not think
you can rest or sustain your Supreme Court by giving a very circumscribed and... muti-
lated notion of something as political and something that is not political. These things are
inextricably bound together.
See D. MCKEAN, supra note 1, at 102-03.
240. See Schneyer, Sunset for the Unified Bar?, 12 B. LEADER 20, 22 (Sept.-Oct. 1986).
241. According to Professor Schneyer, problems for the integrated bar are created from ex-
ternal and internal forces. The internal problem is "the obstruction of bar operations by dissident
members." Id. at 21. The external symptom relates to the involvement of courts and legislatures
in the governance and operations of the bar. Id. In Wisconsin, for example, the supreme court
has the authority to appoint a committee to review the state bar's performance in carrying out its
functions. See SCR 10.10 (1988). Anytime the court appoints a committee to review Bar activi-
ties, the cost for the investigation is borne by the State Bar. For example, the Kelly Committee's
work in 1982 cost the State Bar approximately $50,000 in direct expenses and approximately
another $50,000 in voluntary time put in by bar leaders. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 92-93.
Schneyer also suggests that the integrated bar is at a disadvantage in legislative advocacy as com-
pared to other associations. For example, in 1986 a medical malpractice reform compromise was
reached between Wisconsin's state medical society and the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers.
The State Bar did not become involved. See Schneyer, supra note 240, at 22. For a discussion of
related problems inherent in the unified bar, see supra, notes 24-27 and accompanying text. But
see Ross, The Sun Still Shines on the Unified Bar, 12 B. LEADER 18 (Sept.-Oct. 1986) (unified bar
is an effective organization to examine public institutions and processes as well as to insure equal
access to justice).
242. Although the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that mandatory membership




However, certain record keeping programs that would remain under State
Bar control should receive funding from additional lawyer assessments.243
In membership and finance, statistics indicate that voluntary state bars
have learned how to retain a broad membership base and have demon-
strated their ability to raise funds just as effectively as the integrated bars. 2"
Arguably, membership stability will also be maintained by virtue of the
bar's role in providing a forum for CLE courses. Since the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has mandated that each lawyer must receive thirty credit
hours every two years, the impetus created by that requirement will help
retain membership. 245 Furthermore, the concern that voluntary status
would significantly reduce bar revenue is misplaced. Currently, mandatory
bar dues are only a fraction of the total revenue received by the State Bar.246
With the proposed additional assessments on lawyers to support bar admin-
istrative functions and the increase in dues which would accompany volun-
tary bar status, the State Bar will be able to maintain a majority of its
programs.
VI. CONCLUSION
The mandatory bar was considered the most efficient organization to
advance both public interests and the interests of the legal profession. But,
as time passed, it became clear that integration did not produce a self-gov-
erning bar; however, it did produce a bar that was inherently flawed. Com-
pulsory membership inevitably led to court imposed restrictions, disruption
by unwilling participants and costly litigation.
Perception of the constitutional justification for integration has also
evolved. Although at one time the mandatory bar was perhaps vested with
enough regulatory power to warrant compulsory membership, the trend
suggests a more diminished role. Whether this factor will significantly im-
pact on a first amendment analysis of the bar is unclear. A consistent appli-
cation of the first amendment to compulsory participation in the integrated
bar has heretofore eluded the courts. This is the fault of both lawyers and
243. The state bar does perform certain administrative functions (such as collecting records
on trust accounts for BAPR) which could be paid for by an assessment on all lawyers. Addition-
ally, the supreme court could always step in and sanction additional assessments on lawyers for
essential programs (i.e., the Lawyer Information Referral Service) if the voluntary bar lacks suffi-
cient resources.
244. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
245. This assertion is supported by the fact that nearly 90% of Wisconsin's lawyers renewed
their membership in the voluntary bar. See supra note 22.
246. According to the 1988 State Bar Annual Report, membership dues were only 33% of




judges, who are perhaps more willing to vigorously enforce the rights of
others than their own rights as private citizens.
This most recent round of litigation is an opportunity for the courts to
recapture and imbue some consistency to the methodology applied to the
constitutional infringeme.nts occasioned by compulsory association.
Although the state might sanction a compulsory association, it has the bur-
den of presenting exceptional circumstances which justify the infringement
on individual liberty. Based on the current state of the integrated bar, the
voluntary bar seems ideally suited for preserving individual freedom for its
members and autonomous unrestricted control for itself.
PETER A. MARTIN*
* The author wishes to extend appreciation to Professor Michael K. McChrystal for his gui-
dance in the preparation of this Comment.
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